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Abstract
In this paper, we highlight the economic effects of the existence of child trafﬁcking. We
show that the risk of child trafﬁcking on the labor market acts as a deterrent to supply child
labor, unless household survival is at stake. An imperfectly enforceable legislation aiming
at ﬁghting child trafﬁcking, by raising the expected gains parents derive from sending their
children to work, will cause a rise in the number of child laborers. We show that it can even
cause the incidence of child trafﬁcking to rise. Our ﬁndings are consistent with the view that
the ﬁght against child trafﬁcking can only be won by effectively combining legislation with
other policy measures, including better quality for education, redistribution, or appropriately
targeted poverty alleviation programs.
Keywords: Child labor, exploitation, poverty, law enforcement, trafﬁcking
JEL classiﬁcation: J22, J82, O15
1 Introduction
Exploitation is a social crime. Exploitation of children is an even bigger one. Yet stories abound
of the deception many parents experience when conﬁding their children to the care of reward-
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1promising entrepreneurs (see, for example, Lin Lean Lim, 1998). Children are often abducted,
trafﬁcked away, and deprived of the promised better future. Cross-border trafﬁcking is distin-
guished from mere immigrant-smuggling by the degree of coercion, deception and exploitation.
Under international law, trafﬁcking is a crime involving the movement of persons and their ex-
ploitation. The exploitation can take several different forms: forced labor, prostitution and in some
cases forced conscription. According to the International Labor Organization (ILO-IPEC, 2002),
for instance, close to 200,000 foreign children were trafﬁcked into Thailand in 1996. According to
the same report, approximately 20,000 children and young women are being exploited for sexual
services in the sole city of Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The average age of these girls is about 15
years. West Africa is also an important source of supply. Reports indicate that thousands of chil-
dren are exported from the region, some to work in the Middle East and Europe as unpaid laborers
or for sexual exploitation.1 In Europe itself, growing poverty in the countries of Eastern Europe,
increasing demand for labor of all kinds in Western Europe and the facility of open borders have
resulted in massive movements of people – both legal and illegal – from East to West and in the
trafﬁcking of children and adults.
So there is no doubt that cross-border child trafﬁcking for exploitation is an issue of global
concern. And, thanks to a recent surge in ILO-sponsored empirical research on child trafﬁcking,
we know that trafﬁcking agents thrive on deception and coercion. Available data also suggest
that trafﬁckers usually prey on children seeking paid employment away from their home, and
that parents, while aware of the risks associated with their sending children off to work, have
imperfect information over the outcome of this decision (ILO-IPEC, 2002). However, there is still
a knowledge gap in both the analysis of the problem and in ﬁnding effective means to eradicate
it. For example, does the growing incidence of child trafﬁcking necessarily reﬂect a lack of law-
enforcement efforts? This question is a crucial one to consider for two reasons. On the one
hand, given the hidden nature of trafﬁcking and exploitation, the evidence suggests that legislative
measures both at the source and in the destination countries are not perfectly enforceable, even
in the richest countries.2 On the other hand, internationally agreed strategies to eliminate child
1See The Economist, April 19th 2001.
2In the United States, for example, an estimated 400,000 children are reported to be victims of prostitution
and other forms of commercial sex. The vast majority of them are Americans, mostly from the Midwest (The
Economist, May 30th 2002). Other rich countries such as Canada also report positive incidence of child trafﬁck-
ing (www.savethechildren.ca). We take this evidence as suggesting that, in these countries, the ﬁght against child
2trafﬁcking and exploitation continue to focus on better law-enforcement alone as the main concept
of prevention. For example, ILO-IPEC-funded regional projects all recommend the adoption and
enforcement of lawsmaking childexploitationa punishablecrime. Some countries’own initiatives
also echo this legislative intolerance of child trafﬁcking and exploitation. For instance, the United
States’ Justice Department, under the Trafﬁcking Victim Protection Act passed in 2000, demands
that source countries step up the investigation and prosecution of trafﬁckers, or risk the loss of
non-humanitarian aid.3
Yet, notwithstanding the obvious criminal nature of child trafﬁcking, there is no evidence that
better law-enforcement, alone, can end poverty — the primary determinant of the vulnerability of
children to trafﬁcking. Under these circumstances, the question of how the incidence of child traf-
ﬁcking will respond to better, albeit imperfect, law-enforcement becomes non-trivial. Indeed, if,
as the data suggest, trafﬁcking occurs when children are sent to the labor market, one may expect a
high likelihood of child trafﬁcking to reduce the expected utility gain altruistic parents derive from
sending their children to the labor market. As rational decision makers, parents would take this
into consideration when deciding on their children’s time use. Arguably, the number of children
sent to the labor market may therefore be smaller when parents are aware of a high likelihood of
child trafﬁcking. Better law-enforcement, by reducing the likelihood that a child sent to the labor
market will fall victim to trafﬁcking agents, will therefore cause more children to be sent to the
labor market. Depending upon the degree of imperfection of the enforcement mechanism, better
law-enforcement may actually lead to more children being trafﬁcked away for exploitation, sim-
ply because there are many more of them around. This surprising result is not unrelated to the
Peltzman puzzle: Sam Peltzman (1975) showed that the introduction of a regulation mandating
the installation of more safety devices in automobiles could lead to an increase in the number of
automobile accidents.
In this paper, we develop a simple theory of child trafﬁcking based upon a two-period model of
rational agents. Parents, in our model, are altruistic, expected-utility maximizers who must decide
on their children’s time use. A child’s time has two competing claims: leisure and work. Unlike
leisure, work has two possible outcomes: On the one hand, a child sent to the labor market can
be lucky and ﬁnd a genuine, non-exploitative paid employment, in which case he contributes the
total proceeds from his labor to his family income; on the other hand, he can be unlucky and fall
trafﬁcking is characterized by imperfect law-enforcement.
3See The Economist, May 30th 2002.
3victim to predators who trafﬁc their victims abroad to be exploited. Prior to the decision to send his
child out to seek employment, each parent only knows the probability that the child will be victim
of trafﬁckers. In our model, parents are heterogeneous in that they differ in their endowment of
a consumption good. The difference in endowment levels is the only source of inequality in the
economy.
In such an environment, we ﬁnd that parents can be divided into three groups according to their
choices. In the ﬁrst group, parents would send their children to the labor market whether or not this
exposes them to the risk of exploitation. These are the poorest of the poor. Parents in the second
group would choose leisure as the only occupation for their children, unless there is better law-
enforcement against child trafﬁcking, in which case children would be sent to work. This second
group is composed of “not-so-poor” parents. The third group, in contrast, consists of parents who
would choose leisure as the only occupation for their children whether or not the law against child
trafﬁcking is enforced. These parents are clearly the richest of all. When analyzing the effects of
the new legislation, understanding the response of parents in the second group turns out to be of
extreme importance. Depending on the latter response, the ﬁght against child trafﬁcking can in fact
lead to a higher incidence of trafﬁcked children. Some of our ﬁndings are illustrated numerically.
2 Related Literature
Our research is related to Kenneth A. Swinnerton and Carol A. Rogers (2002). In their paper,
Swinnerton and Rogers explore the welfare effects of banning exploitative forms of child labor in
an environment with risk-neutral, homogeneous parents. Their model is mostly concerned with
the modeling of the demand side of child labor. This demand originates from capitalists who are
the ﬁrms owners hiring labor for production. Capitalists have two options for earning a return on
their capital. They can either pay children workers a competitive wage or simply exploit them, in
which case children get little or no pay. These capitalists, or residual claimants, move from the
non-exploitativesector to the exploitative sector until returns to capital are equalized between both
sectors. Hence the endogeneity of the demand for both forms of child labor. A direct implication
of that feature of their environment is that the demand for child labor is responsive to the adoption
of a perfectly enforceable ban. In their model, legislative intervention alone can lead to a welfare-
improving eradication of child exploitation, because it forces capitalists to operate in the non-
exploitative sector only.
4Our analysis differs from Swinnerton and Rogers’s in at least three respects: First, we take into
consideration the fact that enforcement of a law punishingchild trafﬁckers is unlikely to be perfect.
In such case, we argue that better law-enforcement, in order to be effective in eradicating child ex-
ploitation, must be accompanied by other policies, those that raise the opportunity cost of sending
children to the labor market. This result is consistent with recent empirical ﬁndings (ILO-IPEC
2002). Examples of accompanying policies include improvements in the quality of education,4
redistribution, or appropriately targeted poverty alleviation programs. Second, Swinnerton and
Rogers (2002) consider exploitation of children on domestic informal markets. Exploitation in
their model implies a wage below the marginal product of labor. We model another reality, the
trafﬁcking of children away from their parents. As we showed above, this constitutes a substantial
part of child exploitation. Third, unlike Swinnerton and Rogers (2002) who implicitly assume the
proportion of child laborers to be ﬁxed, we allow for the possibility that parents may increase the
supply of child labor as the law makes it less risky for children to work. This may turn out to be
crucial once we analyze the labor market implications of the law.
Our paper is also linked to the literature on the worst forms of child labor. The trafﬁcking
of children workers clearly falls in the ILO’s deﬁnition of the worst forms of child labor. One
should distinguish, however, between child trafﬁcking and hazardous child labor. Child trafﬁcking
underlines a sense of abuse and deception, and slavery-like labor. Not all hazardous child labor
involve deception and abuse. Instead, hazardous child labor often offers much better returns than
non-hazardous child labor, and thus tends to be more attractive to children, or to their parents
(Victoria Rialp, 1993). In a recent paper, (Sylvain Dessy and St´ ephane Pallage, 2002), we show
that banning hazardous child labor is hardly socially desirable because of the adverse effect of the
ban on the wage of children in the non-hazardous sector.
If child exploitationhas not been studied much, there exists, however, a large literature on child
labor, both theoretical and empirical. The theoretical literature was initiated by the seminal work
of Kaushik Basu and Pham Hoang Van (1998). Among the contributors are Priya Ranjan (1999,
2001), Basu (1999, 2000), Dessy (2000), Dessy and Pallage (2001, 2002), and Dessy and D´ esir´ e
Vencatachellum (2003). The empirical literature was started somewhat earlier, with the works of
Christiaan Grootaert and Ravi Kanbur (1995); and Sudharshan Canagarajah and Harold Coulombe
(1997).
4In this paper, however,we do not explicitlymodel education,as the alternativeto child labor. Instead, we consider
leisure, but it can easily be interpreted as education.
53 The model economy
We consider a one-good economy with a continuum of heterogeneous parents of mass normalized
to 1. Each parent has one period left to live. Parents differ in their endowment,
￿ , of the unique
consumptiongood. The distributionof parents by endowmentlevelsis described by a continuously
differentiable cumulative distribution function
￿ with strictly positive density














































￿ . These differences in parental
endowments are the only source of inequality in this economy.
Each parent bears one child in the beginning of the period and must decide whether, for his
child, childhood is to be a period of protection and nurturing through leisure for example, or a
period of labor force participation during which the child is to contribute to the household income.
Labor force participation, however, may expose the child to predators who trafﬁc their victims
away for exploitation. Trafﬁcking takes place in the labor market only. We assume that a child






consumption good in exchange for his labor. In contrast, a child who falls victim to trafﬁckers is
taken away and does not return to his parent.
The informational structure in this economy is as follows. Each parent knows that sending his
child to the labor market is risky in that the child may be a victimof trafﬁckers. However, no parent
















￿ that a child sent to the labor market falls prey to a trafﬁcking agent.
For simplicity, we assume that leisure and work are mutually exclusive. Let
3 denote the





￿ means that the child is not sent
to the labor market given the likelihood





/ means that the
child is sent to the labor market despite this risk. We ﬁrst ask which parents are better off sending
their children to the labor market, given
) .
3.1 The parents’ problem
In addition to their own consumption, parents care about their children’s emotional, mental and
cognitive development, which is assumed to be promoted by a leisurely activity.5 Given
) , if a
parent with endowment level
￿ decides that his child should not participate to the labor force then
5One can interpret such leisurely activity as being free education.
6leisure will be the child’s only activity. In that case, the parent gains a levelof utility
7 from raising







￿ from consuming a quantity








￿ to be strictly increasing and strictly concave. However, if he decides that his child


















’ . If the household is unlucky instead, and the child ends up falling victim to trafﬁcking







￿ net of the disutility,
E
F
￿from losing the child. In other


























￿ denote the value for a parent of choosing
3 when his endowment of the
consumption good is




































































































































































/ , his expected welfare is equal to the level of welfare that would




























































































￿ , it must be that he has a level
of endowment,









































































































￿ . Using (2) and (3), and assuming,

































































￿ be the solution to the above equation.
6It could be argued that there is an asymmetry in the beneﬁt of having a well-nurtured child
m and the cost of
losing this child
n . Some might even claim that
n is inﬁnite. Since we do observe children sent to the labor market
in spite of the risk of trafﬁcking, it must be, however, that











7Lemma 1 The function












































































| denote the partial derivativeof
w with respect to its

































































































The implicit function theorem may then be applied to establish the results.
Part (i) of Lemma 1 states that an increase in the child labor wage raises the level of endowment
necessary for the parent to be indifferent between the two options. Part (ii) states that a rise in the
likelihood of child trafﬁcking does exactly the reverse: it lowers the level of endowment necessary
for a parent tobe indifferentbetween sendingornot sendinghischildtothe labormarket. Lemma1
implies that while poverty may force parents to consider sending their children to the labor market,
the likelihood of child trafﬁcking, in contrast, may force them to reconsider that decision, unless
they are too wretched to care. We will show further below that Lemma 1 indeed formalizes the
determinants of the supply of child labor.
3.2 Production
Output is produced by perfectly competitive ﬁrms. For simplicity, we restrict the labor force to
children and assume that all honest ﬁrms hire only children and have access to the same technology































￿ denotes the demand for child labor. Proﬁt maximization by perfectly competitive ﬁrms















￿ be the total mass of children sent to the labor market,
￿
~
￿ , the incidence of non-
exploitative child labor and
￿
~
￿ , the incidence of child trafﬁcking for exploitation. Since we




















































Given our normalization of the population size, it is clear that
￿ , equals the total mass of parents












































Given the properties of
￿ ,
k , and










￿ of the distribution
of endowments such that this ﬁxed-point problem has a solution.
4 The effects of better law-enforcement
In this section, we characterize a market equilibrium.


















￿ , such that:




i solves (5), and

































































i , establishing the existence of an equilibrium with child trafﬁcking
reduces to establishing that there exists a non-vanishing solution,
￿
￿
i , to the ﬁxed-point problem











Proposition 1 states that child trafﬁcking exists whenever poverty pushes parents to send their







￿ ), despite the risk of abduction.
9Proposition 2 If the function
￿ is not too concave, then, in equilibrium, the total mass of parents














￿ denote the equilibrium mass of parents who elect to send their children
to the labor market when the state of nature in this environment is described by












































































| denote the partial derivative of
￿ with respect to its






























































































































































































Proposition 2 states that when parents believe that there is a high likelihood that sending their
children to the labor market will expose these children to trafﬁcking agents, this belief causes them
to discount the payoffs associated with that option. In other words, the likelihood of trafﬁcking
makes parents more cautious, as they understand that child labor may fail to “remedy” the very
poverty that drives its supply. This in turn, tends to discourage them from sending their children
to work, unless they are too poor to care. A direct implication of this is that any exogenous device
that reduces the likelihood of child trafﬁcking,
)
X
￿ will push more children into the labor market if a
condition such as (12) is satisﬁed. This condition implies that it takes too high an inﬂux of children
into the non-exploitative forms of child labor to cause a signiﬁcant decline in the wage rate. This
might be the case for example if the technology used in non-exploitative child labor is sufﬁciently
labor-intensive, which is not unusual.
Since with a high likelihood of child trafﬁcking fewer parents send their children to the labor
market, clearly the incidence of non-exploitative child labor will be smaller than it would have

















































￿ . Hence the following result:
10Proposition 3 If condition (12) holds, then an exogenous decline in the likelihood of child traf-
ﬁcking raises the incidence of non-exploitative child labor.
Since a decline in
) draws more children into the labor market, it is not surprising that more of
them will end up ﬁnding a genuine employment opportunity, albeit with a lower wage.






￿ ). However, since trafﬁcking is hard to detect even in rich countries,
it is unlikely that such law will ever be perfectly enforceable. In the context of this study, a
legislation ﬁghting child trafﬁcking is said to be imperfectly enforceable if the probability that
a child seeking employment falls victim to trafﬁckers declines with enforcement, albeit without
completely vanishing. Therefore, the effect on the incidence of child trafﬁcking of the enforcement














































￿ by proposition 2, the ﬁrst term on the right-hand-side is negative and represents
an indirect effect, while the second is positive and represents the direct effect. Depending upon
the degree of imperfection of the enforcement mechanism, better-enforcement of the law banning
child trafﬁcking may or may not cause the incidence of child trafﬁcking to decline. In what follows
we illustrate this ﬁnding with a numerical example.
5 A numerical example










































































































￿ . Furthermore, the use of a logarithmic utility speciﬁcation is standard in the
literature on parental choice of child occupation (see, e.g., Kremer and Chen, 1999). Finally, the
choice of a uniform distribution of endowments is made for simplicity, without loss of generality.7
7It should be noted that none of our results hinge on the quadratic form of the production function. A more
conventional Cobb-Douglas function would yield the same conclusions.
115.1 Some Parametric Results




































































































￿ as in Lemma 1.


































































































































￿ , yields the equilibrium mass of parents who are better off sending their





































































































































































































































































































Figure 1 shows the incidence of child labor




function of the probability of victimization
) for speciﬁc values of the parameters satisfying all
our constraints.8 As can be seen from the picture, for high enough values of
) , the risk that a

















￿ become positive. For a large portion of the
bottom part of the ﬁgure, however, the decrease in the probability of victimization leads to a higher
number of victims. Indeed, parents adjust to the safer environment and tend to send their children
in proportionally larger numbers to the labor market.
The top panel of Figure 1 allows us to identify three different groups of parents. Standing out
on top of the intercept is a group of parents (25% with this parameterization) who would never
send their children to the labor market, regardless of the risk of trafﬁcking
) . These parents are
rich enough that they are better off without their child’s labor. Depending on the value of
) , there
may also exist a group of parents whose budget is so tight that they may end up taking the risk to
send their children to the labor market and a group of parents who might take the risk for lower
) but do not for its current value. The responsiveness of this latter group to reductions in the risk
of trafﬁcking is key to understand. If we ignored this group of parents, any policy resulting in a
lowering of
) would be successful at reducing trafﬁcking. Because the ignored group of parents
may have a more than proportional response to a decrease in
) , however, the same well-intended
policy may lead to an actual increase in the incidence of trafﬁcking.
No doubt, any reduction of child trafﬁcking is socially desirable. It is not clear, however that
improvements in law enforcement against child trafﬁckers will necessarily achieve the desired
goal. It can, in fact, prove counter-productive if enforcement was initially poor.
Law enforcement in the poorest countries is known to be deﬁcient. Not surprisingly, these are
also the countries where child trafﬁcking thrives. The ﬁrst message from this paper is that caution
is therefore needed when designing laws to ﬁght child trafﬁcking.
8We assign numerical values to the relevant parameters, paying particular attention to conditions (16)-(17). The






























13The second message from this paper is that one should not disregard policies that aim at in-
creasing the opportunity cost of child labor, or reducing poverty. Such policies will help reduce
the number of parents constrained to gamble with their child’s life.
Figure 1:









Proportion of children sent to the labor market as a function of p









Incidence of child trafficking as a function of p
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we studied the economic consequences of adopting an imperfectly enforceable leg-
islation against child trafﬁcking. We developed a simple theory of child trafﬁcking within a two-
period, heterogeneous-agent model, with altruistic parents.
We use this model to show that, in an environment characterized by imperfect information
over the outcome of children’s labor market participation, an imperfectly enforceable ban on child
trafﬁckinghas twomajor effects. First itcauses moreparents tosend theirchildren towork (the law
14makes it safer for children to venture into the labor market). Second, depending upon the degree of
imperfection of the enforcement mechanism, it can cause the incidence of child trafﬁcking to rise.
With this ﬁnding, our paper supports the view that the ﬁght against child trafﬁcking can only be
won by effectively combining legislation with other policy measures, such as improvements in the
quality of education, redistribution, or appropriately targeted poverty alleviation programs. These
accompanying policies are necessary to raise the opportunity cost of sending children to work.
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